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ABSTRACT—The state grants residents who live within a school district’s
border an ownership interest in that district’s schools. This interest includes
the power to exclude nonresidents. To attend school in a school district, a
child must prove that she lives at an in-district address and is a bona fide
resident. But in highly-sought-after districts and schools, establishing a
child’s bona fide residence may be highly contested.
In this Essay, I show that education law, policies, and practices fail to
recognize a child’s residence when the child’s family and living situation do
not comport with a particular ideal of family life. This ideal is rooted in the
archetype of the White, middle-class nuclear family headed and controlled
by two parents and living in a single dwelling around which all family life
revolves—a “home.” While this idea may be normatively familiar, it is
elusive for many families. For many families, especially the race–class–
gender subordinated, “family” looks and functions differently from the
archetype. Parents are rarely the only or primary caregivers for children in
these families, and home-making is likely to occur across multiple sites, not
just one “home.” By valorizing the nuclear family and its accouterments—
and refusing to consider other family forms as sufficient to establish
residency—residency requirements not only impede access to educational
resources for those who are most in need, but also entrench a race–class–
gender-specific ideal of the family and ignore the reality of how many
families actually function.
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INTRODUCTION
Kelley Williams-Bolar, a Black, single mother living in Ohio, was
charged, convicted, and incarcerated for the crime of “stealing education.”1
Many states make it illegal for a parent to enroll their child in school districts
where the child does not reside.2 The public reaction to Ms. Williams-Bolar’s
conviction and jail time was intense: a commentator and scholar declared her
“the Rosa Parks of the modern day parent empowerment movement” for
bravely resisting the education system’s hegemonic residency requirements
for school attendance.3
But this oft-told story about Ms. Williams-Bolar’s case is only partially
correct. At the time, Ms. Williams-Bolar did not challenge the residency laws
themselves.4 Instead, she argued that her children met their requirements.

1

LaToya Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, 105 VA. L. REV. 397, 403 (2018) [hereinafter
Baldwin Clark, Education as Property]; Ohio v. Williams-Bolar Case Docket, SUMMIT CNTY. CLERK
OF CTS., https://clerkweb.summitoh.net/RecordsSearch/Dockets.asp?CaseID=645205&CT=&Suffix=
[https://perma.cc/CM69-FEQZ].
2
See LaToya Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, 68 UCLA L. REV. 566, 592–97 (2021) [hereinafter
Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education].
3
See id. at 573 n.23 (quoting Gloria Romero, From Topeka, to Adelanto, and Montgomery County:
Brown v. School Board of Education Continues, 13 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 20, 27 (2014)).
4
Today, Ms. Williams-Bolar is an advocate for educational equality. See Kelley Williams-Bolar: The
Pursuit of Education as the Great Equalizer, FOREST OF THE RAIN PRODS.,
https://www.forestoftherain.net/kelley-williams-bolar-8203the-pursuit-of-education-as-the-greatequalizer.html [https://perma.cc/3V2Y-S6UA]. She often speaks about why she wanted her children in a
better school district and sometimes seems to allege that she was challenging the residential laws
themselves. However, this was not her original argument. See Mother Jailed for School Fraud, Flares
Controversy, NPR (Jan. 28, 2011, 12:00 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133306180/MotherJailed-For-School-Fraud-Flares-Controversy [https://perma.cc/977S-WMR5] (“Williams-Bolar decided
four years ago to send her daughters to a highly ranked school in neighboring Copley-Fairlawn School
District. But it wasn’t her Akron district of residence, so her children were ineligible to attend school
there, even though her father lived within the district’s boundaries.”).
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Ms. Williams-Bolar and her two children lived together in a
neighborhood she deemed unsafe.5 Given her concerns about her children’s
well-being, she placed them with their grandfather at his home, located in a
safer community.6 Because her children were residing in this new
community, she enrolled them in the neighborhood school which, in her
view, the children were entitled to attend because they lived with their
grandfather.7 Ms. Williams-Bolar asserted that her father’s home was the
“family home.”8 Not only did her children reside there, but she also stayed
at the home periodically.9 When discussing the issue of whether she did live
at her grandfather’s, Ms. Williams-Bolar described a living arrangement in
which her children repeatedly moved between multiple homes: “[T]hey
would stay here and they would stay at the other address. . . . [T]hey would
stay with their dad. They would stay with the other grandparents. [M]y kids
have more than one residency.”10
When the school district learned of the children’s living arrangement, it
accused Ms. Williams-Bolar of willfully “stealing” education.11 She resisted,
arguing that her children resided with their grandfather and thus were eligible
to attend the school.12 Her case went to trial.13 A jury rejected her argument
about residency, found her guilty, and sentenced her to ten days in jail.14 Ms.
Williams-Bolar served nine days, plus two years of probation.15
The court’s decision that Ms. Williams-Bolar “stole” education meant
the court believed she knowingly violated the “bona fide residence”

5

See Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note 1, at 403.
See id.
7
Ohio Mom Defends Sending Kids to Better School District, NPR (Feb. 10, 2011, 12:00 PM)
[hereinafter Ohio Mom Defends], https://www.npr.org/2011/02/10/133654397/Ohio-Mom-DefendsSending-Kids-To-Better-School-District [https://perma.cc/89UW-SSHW. Ms. Williams-Bolar alleges
that she obtained a “grandparent power of attorney,” which she believed to be sufficient to attest to the
children’s residence with their grandfather. Id.
8
Id. (“First of all, my dad’s home is - that’s my family home. And my dad always told me that his
home, you know, is my home. And that’s how, you know, that’s - I’ve always, it’s my daddy’s house.
I’ve always, always been like that.”).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note 1, at 401. Ms. Williams-Bolar’s father was also
charged with grand theft, a fourth-degree felony. Id. at 407 n.53.
12
Id. at 403.
13
See id. at 407.
14
Ms. Williams-Bolar’s alleged illegal conduct occurred between 2006 and 2008. She was indicted
in 2009 and was convicted in 2011. At the time of indictment, her children no longer attended the school.
Ohio Mom Defends, supra note 7.
15
Id. Her sentence was subsequently commuted by the governor. John R. Kasich, Governor of the
State of Ohio, Commutation of the Offenses and Sentences of Kelley Williams-Bolar (Sept. 6, 2011),
https://perma.cc/ACA4-EQL9.
6
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requirements prescribed by the state.16 Under such laws, only children who
are bona fide residents in a locality have an ownership interest in a
jurisdiction’s schools, whereby they cannot be excluded from receiving the
school district’s education.17 According to the Supreme Court, “[a] bona fide
residence requirement . . . furthers the substantial state interest in assuring
that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents.”18
However, as Ms. Williams-Bolar’s case illustrates, establishing a
child’s residence for school district eligibility purposes may be more
complicated for some families than the residency requirements allow. In this
Essay, I argue that the criteria for determining a child’s bona fide residence
create a legal reality under which living with family is not living at “home.”
Those criteria reflect unstated assumptions about family life, whether
consciously or unconsciously. They tend to exclude working-class and poor
non-White19 children from well-resourced schools, especially those children
with single-mother heads of household.20 This exclusion has enormous
consequences. Once a child proves that they are a resident, other benefits
follow, most notably that the child cannot be excluded from attending that
district’s schools.21 Suppose a family can establish residence for a child to
attend highly-sought-after, richly resourced schools. In that case, that child
can access valuable economic, social, and cultural capital22 that can disrupt

16

Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note 1, at 404–05.
Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 590–92; see Baldwin Clark, Education as
Property, supra note 1, at 409–10.
18
Martinez ex rel. Morales v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983).
19
I capitalize “White” throughout this essay. The proper noun usage of the word forces an
understanding of “White” as a social and political construct and social identity in line with the social and
political construct and social identity of “Black.” See Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note
1, at 408–09 (discussing Whiteness as a “form of racialized privilege” in accessing social, economic, and
political advantages).
20
This is not to say that White children are unaffected by these assumptions, especially poor White
children. But the disproportionate impact on non-White families, and especially Black families, warrants
special consideration. See infra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
21
Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 570 (“Only residence within a school district’s
jurisdiction confers on a parent a ‘seat license’ unavailable to nonresident parents.”).
22
Id. at 626–27.
17
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the social reproduction23 of race–class–gender stratification24 and
subordination.25 Bona fide residency requirements, as currently written,
entail exclusion that precludes access to schools where those capitals are in
abundance.
The school residency laws have three components that determine from
whom a child can derive residence, where they can demonstrate that
residence, and why. 26 First, state-level residency statutes explicitly link a
child’s residence to their parent’s residence, regardless of whether the child
actually resides with their parent. Second, even when a child lives with their
parent, residency statutes require that the child’s residence be a “home” for
the child to be eligible for school benefits. A “home,” in this context, refers
to a singular address around which the entirety of the family’s life revolves.
Third, a district can exclude a child if it determines that the parent established
a child’s home as their residence only to attend school.
As explained in this Essay, these aspects of school residency laws
impact the options for children in families who, whether by choice or
circumstance, do not conform to the nuclear-family ideal. By the ideal-type
nuclear family, I mean a White, middle-class, married couple who co-reside
with their children in a single residence, shared by that nuclear family.
23
By social reproduction, I mean the tendency of stratification to be intergenerationally stable.
LaToya Baldwin Clark, Beyond Bias: Cultural Capital in Anti-Discrimination Law, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 381, 410 (2018) [hereinafter Baldwin Clark, Beyond Bias] (“Social reproduction theories attempt
to explain how and why the social order at time one relates to the social order at time two. Specifically,
social reproduction theories seek to uncover how social institutions contribute to ‘the reproduction of the
structure of power relationships and symbolic relationships’ between social groups.” (quoting Pierre
Bourdieu, Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction, in 3 CULTURE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN
SOCIOLOGY 63 (Chris Jenks ed., 2003))).
24
Stratification refers to the “hierarchical status or rank” among groups. Talcott Parsons, Equality
and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification Revisited, 40 SOCIO. INQUIRY 13, 13 (1970).
25
What constitutes “subordination” can be gleaned from what Professor Ruth Colker calls the antisubordination perspective:

Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have
subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole. This approach seeks to
eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between whites and non-whites,
through the development of laws and policies that directly redress those disparities. From an antisubordination perspective, both facially differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious
only if they perpetuate racial or sexual hierarchy.
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1007–08 (1986).
26
To describe these requirements, I use the term “school” instead of “education.” Residential
requirements determine who has the right to enroll in and attend a school district’s schools in general,
and specific schools within that district. Accordingly, the laws that exclude nonresidents are excluding
them from access to the education that is provided in those schools. But because the relationship I am
discussing in here specially involves who can walk into a school building for the purposes of accessing
that school’s education, I will use the term “school” rather than “education” in describing the object of
exclusion.
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Instead, nonideal-type families often rely on a network of adults to care
for children and often locate caregiving across multiple sites.27 As a result,
they usually fall outside the specific criteria that school districts rely on to
establish a child’s bona fide residence.
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the contours of
school residency laws, focusing on the who, where, and why aspects of these
laws. In Part II, I illustrate how the school residency laws borrow from
family law themes about form versus function and status versus contract.
Furthermore, I analogize family law’s “biology-plus” framework for
determining parentage to a “property-plus” framework to establish
educational entitlement. Finally, in Part III, I discuss why these assumptions
and imports matter for educational stratification by race, class, and gender.
In this Essay, the reform I advocate for improves the current system because
it allows for residential flexibility, but with significant practical strengths
that tend to elude education reform.
In the Essay, I emphasize the impact on poor Black single mothers’
children compared to other children for several reasons. In doing so, I do not
mean to negate how the dynamics I describe below disadvantage many single
mothers in the United States, not just Black single mothers. But the
intersection of race, class, and gender suggests poor, Black, and singlemother-headed households have unique experiences.
First, the rate of single motherhood is higher among Black families
compared to all other racial groups. Thirty percent of single mothers are
Black, more than twice Black people’s proportion of the U.S. population,
which hovers around 12%.28 In contrast, forty percent of single mothers are
White, compared to White people comprising 58% of the U.S. population.
Latino single mothers are slightly overrepresented; they comprise 24% of
single mothers, compared to Latinos making up 19% of the U.S. population.
Asian mothers comprise 3% of single mothers, compared to Asians making
up 6% of the U.S. population.
Second, there are significant material differences between low-income
Black and other non-White single mothers and low-income White single
mothers. Black single mothers and other racially minoritized single mothers
27
LESLIE PAIK, TRAPPED IN A MAZE: HOW SOCIAL CONTROL INSTITUTIONS DRIVE FAMILY
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 70–71 (2021).
28
All the statistics in this paragraph are from Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of
Unmarried Parents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/socialtrends/2018/04/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/ [https://perma.cc/A3NM-3M83]; and
Mabinty Quarshie & Donovan Slack, Census: US Sees Unprecedented Multiracial Growth, Decline in
the White Population for First Time in History, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2021, 5:26 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/08/12/how-2020-census-change-how-we-lookamerica-what-expect/5493043001/ [https://perma.cc/AW8Z-BASG].
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are much more likely to live in poverty than are White single mothers.29
White single mothers have higher median wealth than Black or Latino single
mothers.30 Wealth is a financial cushion for White single mothers not
available to Black and Latino single mothers. Indeed, many sociologists urge
more attention to how wealth contributes to racial subordination, especially
the role of property.31 Race-based historical and contemporary impediments
to property ownership32 and wealth accumulation suggest that White single
mothers likely have more housing choices than Black single mothers.
Furthermore, even if we focus only on income, the COVID-19
pandemic’s economic impacts illustrate the financial precarity of poor Black
children of single-mother households compared to those of White singleparent-headed families. Black single-mother-headed households suffered
disproportionately due to the jobs Black women tended to hold, which were
disproportionately negatively affected during the pandemic.33 As a result,
Black children fell into poverty at a disproportionately high rate during the
pandemic.34

29
In 2010, around 50% of Black single mothers and Latino single mothers lived in poverty, compared
to 33% of White single mothers. LEGAL MOMENTUM, SINGLE MOTHER POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
IN 2010, at 1 (2011), https://www.legalmomentum.org/library/single-mother-poverty-united-states-2010
[https://perma.cc/57VF-9465]; see also Sophia Kerby, Pay Equity and Single Mothers of Color, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/pay-equity-and-singlemothers-of-color/ [https://perma.cc/LR45-H525] (“Poverty rates are higher for single mothers of color
compared to white single mothers and two parent households.”). Single mothers from all racial groups
have poverty rates far higher than 15%, the poverty rate of Americans as a whole. LEGAL MOMENTUM,
supra, at 1.
30
Kerby, supra note 29.
31
See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 11–13 (1995) (arguing that race differences in opportunity and
outcomes are primarily due to the inability of Black people in the past and present to accumulate wealth
through property ownership).
32
These historical impediments to property ownership and wealth generation include public actions
like redlining, RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 59–67 (2017); private actions such as racially restrictive
covenants, id. at 78–91; racial zoning, id. at 39–57; and exclusion from the suburban boom of the 1950s,
id. at 70–75. In addition, contemporary manifestations of these processes, such as ongoing discrimination
in home lending, continue to artificially restrict Black homeownership and deflate home prices in Black
neighborhoods. See Douglas S. Massey, Racial Discrimination in Housing: A Moving Target, 52 SOC.
PROBS. 148, 149–50 (2005) (stating that even when formal explicit racial discrimination ended, banks
shifted to “‘predatory lending’ whereby poor minorities received less favorable loan terms and are
channeled into problematic forms of housing”).
33
Gracyn Doctor, For Black Single Mothers, COVID-19 Economic Challenges Can Be Magnified,
WFAE (Jan. 19, 2021, 6:55 AM), https://www.wfae.org/health/2021-01-19/for-black-single-motherscovid-19-economic-challenges-can-be-magnified [https://perma.cc/85XE-9PT6].
34
Zachary Parolin & Christopher Wimer, Forecasting Estimates of Poverty During the COVID-19
Crisis, 4 POVERTY & SOC. POL’Y BRIEF, Apr. 16, 2020, at 8.
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Third, of course, many racialized groups exhibit some of the themes I
identify. For example, single parenthood has risen for all racial groups over
the last several decades.35 But low-income single motherhood is often
racialized, encapsulated in constructs such as the stereotypical “welfare
queen.”
[T]he welfare queen archetype is typically represented as a woman whose
irresponsible choice to have children out of wedlock has caused her to turn to
the state for financial support. Fiscally and sexually irresponsible, she is a threat
to social order precisely because she rejects the importance of the nuclear family
as a bedrock social institution. The welfare queen is also represented as
indolent, as she finds ways to indefinitely extend her right to demand support
from the state and to maximize the dollars the state confers. She is an immediate
threat because she imposes a financial burden on the state to support her
children.36

She is not just a woman or a mother, but a Black mother. A content
analysis of media depictions of welfare shows that, concerning attitudes
about welfare, “[g]ender combines with race, and media depictions tie
dependency to racist conceptions of recipients along with traditional
conceptions about women’s roles and sexuality.”37 Dependence is racialized,
as welfare recipients “are represented as black, unmarried mothers out to
cheat the state.”38
35
Livingston, supra note 28 (“In 1968, only 1% of all parents were solo fathers; that figure has risen
to 3%. At the same time, the share of all parents who are solo mothers has doubled, from 7% up to 13%.”).
36
Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race Theory
Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 257, 260 (2016). For other
descriptions of the welfare queen, see Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the
Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 308 (2013) (describing the welfare
queen as “a non-working, substance-abusing, single mother relying on the state for her benefits and lying
to receive more than she deserves”); Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black Mothers
in the Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 385 (2016) (describing the welfare queen as
“an irresponsible, lazy mother who is somehow scamming the system”); and Julilly Kohler-Hausmann,
Welfare Crises, Penal Solutions, and the Origins of the “Welfare Queen,” 41 J. URB. HIST. 756, 757
(2015) (explaining how the welfare queen archetype came to imply “that the ‘average’ [welfare]
recipients were lazy, sexually promiscuous (typically African American) women who shirk both domestic
and wage labor”).
37
Joya Misra, Stephanie Moller & Marina Karides, Envisioning Dependency: Changing Media
Depictions of Welfare in the 20th Century, 50 SOC. PROBS. 482, 496 (2003); see also Ann Cammett,
Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233,
244 (2014) (showing the immediate racialization of the “welfare queen” described by then-presidential
candidate Ronald Reagan); Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, “The Crime of Survival”: Fraud Prosecutions,
Community Surveillance, and the Original “Welfare Queen,” 41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 335 (2007) (arguing
that the term has “racial connotations . . . [and] implicitly references popular beliefs, associated frequently
with the Moynihan Report, which attributed the ‘pathology of the Black family’ to its alleged matriarchal
structure”).
38
Misra, supra note 37, at 496.
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No other low-income race–class–gender family suffers more from that
stereotype of laziness, fraudulence, and general poor parenting than Black
single mothers. Assumptions about unfit parenting manifest, for example, in
the disproportionate numbers of Black children removed from their homes
for neglect, the determination of which often results from financial
precarity.39
Lastly, in this Essay, I am not directly challenging the validity of the
school district boundaries, although my analysis of the residential laws leads
in that direction. Here, I am particularly concerned about how the residential
requirements reify normative ideals of the family. At the end of the Essay,
my prescriptions reflect those concerns while proposing a practical harmreduction approach. But for now, challenging the boundaries themselves is
beyond this Essay’s scope.
I.

EDUCATIONAL RESIDENCE

Establishing a child’s residence in a school district is the first step a
parent must take to enroll their children in school.40 Their residential address
must be contained in that specific district’s attendance boundaries.41
Moreover, schools too have requirements that a child reside within the
school’s attendance boundaries.42 Thirty-two states’ laws explicitly allow
school districts to restrict educational services to only those children who
live within a district’s attendance boundaries.43
The question becomes: How does one define residency? Courts often
use dictionary definitions to explain otherwise undefined terms. Black’s Law
Dictionary is an obvious starting point. That dictionary defines residence as
“[t]he act or fact of living in a given place for some time;” it is “[t]he place
where one actually lives,” a “house or other fixed abode.”44 In turn,
“residence” appears in ninety-four other definition entries that span many

39
See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 6 (2002) (showing
how Black families are disproportionately targeted by the child welfare system); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
TORN APART: HOW THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM DESTROYS BLACK FAMILIES—AND HOW ABOLITION
CAN BUILD A SAFER WORLD (2022) (showing the impact of the child welfare system on Black families
and arguing that the system should be abolished due to its harm to Black families).
40
Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 573.
41
Id. at 570.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 590 n.105.
44
Residence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Residence is also “[t]he place where a
corporation or other enterprise does business or is registered to do business.” Id.
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substantive areas of law.45 These areas include immigration and citizenship,46
private law,47 and, of course, property law.48
In the following sections, I describe the three components of school
residency laws: from whom a child’s address derives, where a child can call
an address a “home,” and inquiries into why the caregiving adult established
that address.
A. Whom
“A child shall be considered a resident of the school district in which
his parents or the guardian of his person resides.”49
As this Pennsylvania statute illustrates, a child’s residence is presumed
to be that of their parent or another person fulfilling a formal, state-approved
parental role. Such requirements are ubiquitous; seventeen state statutes
explicitly presume a child’s residence to be that of their parent.50 For
example, in California, a student “shall attend the public school . . . of the
district in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is

45

A Westlaw search for “residence” in Black’s Law Dictionary shows that “residence” appears in
the definitions of 94 entries in addition to the “residence” entry itself.
46
E.g., Immigrate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“To come to dwell or settle; to move
into a country where one is not a native for the purpose of permanent residence.”).
47
E.g., Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“1. An agreement between two or
more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law <a binding
contract>. 2. The writing that sets forth such an agreement <a contract is valid if valid under the law of
the residence of the party wishing to enforce the contract>.”).
48
E.g., Occupancy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The act, state, or condition of
holding, possessing, or residing in or on something; actual possession, residence, or tenancy, esp. of a
dwelling or land.”); Zoning Ordinance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A city ordinance
that regulates the use to which land within various parts of the city may be put. It allocates uses to the
various districts of a municipality, as by allocating residences to certain parts and businesses to other
parts. A comprehensive zoning ordinance [usually] regulates the height of buildings and the proportion
of the lot area that must be kept free from buildings.”).
49
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302.
50
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 202; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3118; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 76, § 5; MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.020; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:12 (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 1-113; 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-64-1; S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-30; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-289; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1075. To establish their residence, parents and guardians usually present
evidence such as driver’s licenses, utility bills, and lease or mortgage documents. It would be difficult for
a child to meet these requirements: children and young teens often do not have driver’s licenses; they do
not have utility bills in their name; they may or may not appear as occupants on a lease and almost never
are included on mortgage documents. See Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 591–92.
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located.”51 Likewise, in Maine, “[a] person is eligible to attend schools in the
school administrative unit where the person’s parent resides.”52
If a parent cannot establish residency in the desired district, the law
allows a child to live with a nonparent to establish residence. However, to
confer residency benefits on the child, the nonparent must often assume legal
responsibility for all aspects of that child’s life, not only their educational
needs. Essentially, the requirement allows nonparents to confer the benefit
of their resident status only where they function in loco parentis to a child.
This nonparent is often a legal guardian or holds another legal
designation whereby one person (at most two) is responsible for the child.53
Even when states formally recognize relatives as nonparent caregivers, they
require the equivalent of an ideal-type parent–child relationship. For
example, Maryland explicitly allows kinship care as a basis for school
enrollment.54 Children may “attend public school in the county where the
child is domiciled with the child’s parent, guardian, or relative providing
informal kinship care.”55
But Maryland defines kinship care as a “living arrangement in which a
relative of a child, who is not in the care, custody, or guardianship of the
local department of social services, provides for the care and custody of the

51
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200. California’s residence laws “strongly imply[]—though not directly
stat[e]—that the proper school district for enrollment is that ‘in which the [child’s parent’s] residence is
located.’” R.F. v. Delano Union Sch. Dist., 16-cv-01796, 2017 WL 633919, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15,
2017) (third alteration in original). This derives from the Government Code on state sovereignty: A
“residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent,” which, in the case of an unmarried minor
child, requires the act and intent of a parent or legal guardian. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 244(f); Nw. Nat’l Cas.
Co. v. Davis, 90 Cal. App. 3d 782, 785 (1979) (holding that a minor may not acquire a new residence
except through the actions of their parents). Furthermore, North Carolina state law provides that a child,
unless emancipated, “may not establish a domicile different from his parents, surviving parents, or legal
guardian.” Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Sch. Sys. V. Chavioux, 446 S.E.2d 612, 614 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
In California, the rule is:

In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: . . .
(d) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his or her place
of abode is the residence of such unmarried minor child.
(e) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be changed by his or her
own act.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 244. Likewise, the California Welfare and Institutions Code states that “[t]he
residence of the parent with whom the child maintains his or her place of abode or the residence of any
individual who has been appointed legal guardian . . . determines the residence of the child.” C AL. WELF.
& INSTS. CODE § 17.1(a).
52
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5202.
53
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 202; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-3118; MO. ANN. STAT. § 167.020; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-113; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1075.
54
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-101(b)(1).
55
Id.; id. § 7-101(c)(2)(ii).
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child due to a serious family hardship.”56 These hardships, which Maryland
school districts can require proof of, must be extreme conditions that affect
the child’s parent, including parental death, serious illness, drug addiction,
incarceration, abandonment, and military duty.57 The kinship care alternative
is acceptable only if there is “serious family hardship,” suggesting that only
a child’s parents are “family.” In imposing this limitation, the law suggests
that living without parents is at best a “second-best alternative” to be
deviated from only when the parents are unable to be parents.58 Thus,
Maryland requires that a nonparent can establish a child’s address only if the
parent cannot take care of the child.
Other states have similar assumptions about nonparent caregivers and
establishing residence away from a child’s parents, albeit slightly different
mechanisms. For example, consider Pennsylvania’s statute about nonparent
caregivers:
When a resident of any school district keeps in his home a child of school age,
not his own, supporting the child gratis as if it were his own, such child shall be
entitled to all free school privileges accorded to resident school children of the
district . . . .59

56
Id. § 7-101(c)(1)(ii). The adult providing kinship care must be a relative by blood or marriage. Id.
§ 7-101(c)(1)(iii). Maryland differentiates between formal and informal kinship care in Maryland.
Kinship Care, MD. DEPT. OF HUM. SERVS., https://dhs.maryland.gov/foster-care/kinship-care/
[https://perma.cc/6QYN-EDFU].
57
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-101(c)(1)(iv). North Carolina law too allows kinship care as a basis
for school enrollment, but only when parents are unable to care for the child. It allows a child who does
not live with their parent in the desired school district to enroll in school only if their parent is unavailable
due to death, serious illness, incarceration, abandonment, abuse or neglect, impaired physical or mental
condition, relinquishment of custody, “loss or uninhabitability of the student’s home as the result of a
natural disaster,” or some consequence of military service. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-366. While the state
does not require the relative to become a child’s legal guardian, those with legal responsibility for the
child must “complete[] and sign[] separate affidavits that . . . attest that the caregiver has been given and
accepts responsibility for educational decisions for the student.” Id.
58
R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Forward: Moore Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551, 2254
(2017).
59
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302 (emphasis added).
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This statute explicitly recognizes nonparent caregivers. However, for
school enrollment purposes, this person must take on a parent-like role,
caring for the child “as if it were his own.”60 New Jersey law is similar.61
In Indiana, a child’s “legal settlement” for enrolling in a district’s
attendance area is “where the student’s parents reside.”62 While the
presumption is that a child resides with their parent to enroll in school,
Indiana allows other adults to step into the role of parent. If the child’s
parents cannot care for the child, another adult can establish residence if they
care for the child in the parent’s absence. However, this person must
establish themselves as a legal caregiver standing in the parent’s place. In
addition, a district can insist on proving the “appointment of that individual
as legal guardian or custodian.”63 Similarly, in Delaware, while the law
presumes a child shares a residence with her parents, when the child does
not, the child’s primary caregiver needs a “signed order from a court granting
60

In Velazquez ex rel. Speaks-Velazquez v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, 949 A.2d 354,
358 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008), the court held that being a parent is not simply an issue of financial
commitment, but of day-to-day routine child caregiving. A Pennsylvania school district alleged that a
grandmother who was caring for her grandchild was being compensated by receiving child support
payments from the child’s parent, and thus was ineligible to enroll her grandchild in the district that
corresponded with the grandparent’s address:
Adopting the plain meaning of gratis, . . . the trial court mischaracterized the child support
payments received by [the grandmother] as compensation to reach its erroneous conclusion that
she did not support Jose gratis as if he were her own child. Parents are liable for support of their
children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger, and parents must provide for
reasonable expenses of raising their children. The order imposed against Jose’s mother was for
payment of child support to fulfill her obligation to provide childcare expenses for Jose, not to
compensate [the grandmother] for her services.
Id. at 359 (citations omitted). In interpreting the “gratis” support prong, the court held that receiving
child support from the child’s parent was not a payment for keeping the child, but rather for fulfilling
the parents’ support obligations. This suggests that the parental role is more about daily decisions and
close caregiving, not only financial support.
61

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-1(b)(1) states that

[a]ny person who is kept in the home of another person domiciled within the school district and
is supported by such other person gratis as if he were such other person’s own child, upon filing
by such other person with the secretary of the board of education of the district, if so required by
the board, a sworn statement that he is domiciled within the district and is supporting the child
gratis and will assume all personal obligations for the child relative to school requirements and
that he intends so to keep and support the child gratuitously for a longer time than merely through
the school term.
While this statute allows for a nonparent to enroll a child without a formal declaration of guardianship,
the nonparent must nevertheless care for the child “as if [the child] were the [nonparent’s] own child.”
Id. This parent-like relationship requires the nonparent to “assume all personal obligations” without pay.
Id. Thus, even when a state does not require a nonparent to secure legal control over the child, a nonparent
adult seeking to enroll a child in school must establish a parent–child relationship.
62
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-26-11-2.
63
Id.
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custody to or appointing as the child’s guardian the resident with whom that
child is residing.”64
Each of the statutes I have described above allows only those adult–
child relationships that conform to a norm of a nuclear family in which the
parent is the sole caregiver. Children who have care relationships with people
who are not their parents or formal legal guardians are prohibited—via per
se rules—from deriving residency from those people. Furthermore, while
some states’ statutes allow nonparent adult caregivers to bestow residential
entitlements, this is only available by meeting a high standard of parental
hardship. Without the ideal-type parent–child relationship, parents’
residential circumstances limit their children’s options.
B. Where
“‘Residence’ . . . [is] a place where important family activity takes place
during significant parts of each day; a place where the family eats,
sleeps, works, relaxes, plays. It must be a place, in short, which can be
called ‘home.’”
—Board of Education v. Day65

In addition to the requirements that only a parent can establish a
residence for a child, that person must prove that the address is “home.”
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, home is a “dwelling place.”66 This
definition is not that useful, but Black’s also points to another term: domicile.
According to Black’s, domicile is “[t]he place at which a person has been
physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed,
principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and
remain even though currently residing elsewhere.”67 Under this definition,
home has several characteristics that suggest singularity: permanence,
exclusivity, and “truth.”
What must parents do to prove permanence, exclusivity, and “truth”?
Arkansas’s statute prescribes a straightforward formula: a child must “abode
for an average of no less than four (4) calendar days and nights per week.”68
In Massachusetts, the standard is less of a bright line. While “[e]very person
shall have a right to attend the public schools of the town where he actually
resides,”69 that town must be the place where the child “dwells permanently,
not temporarily, and . . . the place that is the center of his or her domestic,
64
65
66
67
68
69
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DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 202.
506 N.E.2d 1239, 1242 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986).
Home, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-202.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 5.
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social, and civic life.”70 Ms. Williams-Bolar’s case in Ohio, referenced
above, requires the same: a child must perform many of life’s essential tasks
in one place with their family, narrowly assumed to be that child’s parent.71
Connecticut case law says that “home” “should be viewed in the context
of the community with which the family is associated.”72 A 1994 case
involved a child whose parents’ property straddled two jurisdictions, New
Canaan and Norwalk. The New Canaan district denied her access to a New
Canaan school because “a majority of the [parent’s] property taxes” were not
paid in New Canaan but in Norwalk. The appeals board overturned the
district’s decision, finding that
[the child’s] family members’ social and community activities [are]
“overwhelmingly focused” on New Canaan organizations. The board further
found that their daily lives are focused in the New Canaan community. A New
Canaan address is listed on their auto registration and driver’s licenses; also,
they pay personal property taxes on automobiles to New Canaan, and are
registered to vote, and have repeatedly done so, in New Canaan. They have
residents’ library cards from the New Canaan Public Library and participate in
library activities. The . . . children play predominantly with New Canaan
residents.73

The court reasoned that schools must look at a “whole constellation of
interests including both geography and the community orientation.”74 Those
interests include “the various recreational ‘affiliations’ that a student may
have, such as membership in scouts.”75 In following the “whole child
concept” the court sought to
recognize[] that extracurricular participation in social, religious and even
commercial activities is important in a child’s development as a beneficial
supplement to the child’s academic involvement. . . . If a child attends school
in his natural community it enhances not only his educational opportunity but
encourages his participation in social and other extracurricular activities.76

70
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Perille, No. 18-11875, 2018 WL 5817024, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 6, 2018)
(discussing a Boston school policy that relies on ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-202).
71
Supra notes 1–10.
72
Baerst v. State Bd. of Educ., 642 A.2d 76, 80–81 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
73
Id. at 77.
74
Id. at 80.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 81. In an older case from Nebraska, evidence of voting was “persuasive of the fact that a
person considered such place his legal residence.” State ex rel. Rittenhouse v. Newman, 204 N.W.2d 372,
375 (Neb. 1973) (interpreting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-215: “[A] student is a resident of the school
district where he or she resides and shall be admitted to any such school district upon request without
charge. A school board shall admit a student upon request without charge if at least one of the student’s
parents resides in the school district.”).
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This case shows that mere presence in a particular jurisdiction is
insufficient to claim residence. A resident is more than an owner or possessor
of land; he is an engaged community member. One must establish more
extensive ties via community–friend networks, employment, vehicle
registration, and other living activities.
What unites each of the preceding statutory regimes is the view that for
purposes of enrolling children in schools, the act of living with one’s
family—including one’s parents—does not necessarily mean that a child’s
address is their home. Accordingly, the law does not respect families who
share child-rearing obligations across many physical locations for various
reasons, including economic precarity. The presence of even a parent-like
caregiver within the jurisdiction does not make a “home” for the children for
whom they provide care. This legal arrangement privileges the archetype of
the nuclear family—parent(s) and child(ren) living together under one roof
all the time.
C. Why
“[R]esiding in the school district ‘solely for the purpose of attending
public school in the district will not be considered residency in the
district for school purposes.’”
—Mina ex rel. Anghel v. Board of Education77

The prior two Sections reveal how determinations about the people
from “whom” children can acquire residency and the circumstances under
which a school district will consider an address a child’s “home” (“where”)
reflect preferred forms of family life. In addition to these requirements,
school residency laws demand even more. A parent can only establish a
“home” if the purpose of creating that home is not solely school attendance.
If a parent established a home for school only, that child will not be
considered a bona fide resident and will not be entitled to the schools.
In Mina ex rel. Anghel v. Board of Education, an Illinois mother
attempted to enroll her children in a district, claiming residence based on
owning a home they were renovating for the family’s habitation and
permanent use.78 The district denied entrance.79 The child attended the school
for a year with her mother listing the in-district address at registration. But
the district noticed that the post office forwarded the family’s mail to the outof-district address, and a teacher allegedly saw the mother driving the

77
809 N.E.2d 168, 176 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Connelly v. Gibbs, 445 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ill.
1983)).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 172–73.
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daughter from the out-of-district address to the school.80 When the child’s
mother attempted to enroll her daughter for the following school year, the
district investigated and determined the child was a nonresident.81
The parents argued that the child should remain in the district because
they owned a home visibly being renovated for habitation.82 The family paid
taxes and utilities at the home. The mother testified “that they did not live
‘physically in just one place,’” as they spent time in the in-district house as
if they lived there.83
The hearing officer rejected the mother’s argument.84 In upholding this
decision, an Illinois court of appeals determined that to establish residence,
the child must be provided with a “fixed and regular [nighttime] abode [that]
cannot be created solely to allow for [the child] to have access to [the]
district[’s] educational programs but, rather, must explicitly be established
for purposes other than this end.”85
80
81

Id. at 170.
The court recounted the facts:

Mike Flagg, the district’s residency investigator, testified that he was called to investigate Andra’s
residency status by the high school soon after the start of the 2002–03 school year. On several
different occasions at different times of the day, he went to the three addresses in question (the
Flossmoor apartment, the Chicago Heights home and the University Park home) and recorded his
observations in a log which he submitted at the hearing. Flagg testified that he went to the
Flossmoor apartment in the morning before school on September 4, 9, and 13, 2002, and Andra
never appeared. He rang the doorbell of the apartment on the evening of September 20, 2002, and
no one answered. He went to the Chicago Heights home on the mornings of September 23,
October 28, and November 13, 2002. He observed that the house was empty, no one answered the
door and it looked like it was being “rehabbed.” Flagg had taken pictures of the home and
submitted them to the hearing officer. He also went to the home on the evening of November 25,
2002, and saw a white car registered to Andra’s parents in the driveway; the “rehab” looked
finished but no one answered the door when he knocked. Flagg testified that he went to the
University Park home on the mornings of September 26, October 1, 7, 11, 22, 30, and November
4, 2002, and the evening of October 18, 2002. Each of these mornings, he saw Andra come out of
the home with her mother and followed them as they drove from University Park to the high
school. In the evening (as well as on several mornings), he saw two cars parked in the driveway,
both of which were registered to Andra’s parents. Flagg further testified that he showed Andra’s
picture to the school bus driver of the route Andra was scheduled to be on, and the bus driver
stated he had never seen her before and she had not ridden the bus that school year. Flagg stated
that the school administration received a telephone call from a community member who told them
no one was living at the Chicago Heights home. Based on his observations and all the information
he obtained, it was Flagg’s conclusion that Andra was residing at the University Park home.
Id. at 171–72.
82
Id. at 170.
83
Id. at 171.
84
Id. at 172.
85
Id. at 175. The court applied a “clearly erroneous” standard where “a decision rendered by the
hearing officer or the Board is clearly erroneous only when, based on the entire record, we are left with
the ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. at 174–75 (quoting AFM
Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 763 N.E.2d 272, 282 (Ill. 2001)).
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It further found that even when a child is living with a parent or legal
custodian, “two elements . . . must be met; that is, in order to have one’s
residence in a certain place, she must both establish a physical presence there
and have the intent to make that location her permanent residence.”86 In this
case, the mother only established the second prong, the intent to make the
location permanent. But because the court found that the child never actually
set a physical presence in the renovated house, that house could not be
considered her residence for school. Furthermore, the court found, when
evaluating the credibility of the family’s assertions, that the “family’s intent
in purchasing the [in-district] home was to live in the district until [the child]
finished school, thereby indicating that the family contemplated leaving the
district once that was accomplished.”87 This case illustrates that owning may
not be enough to establish a bona fide residence.
In other states, the desire to attend a specific school cannot be the sole
purpose for establishing residence in a particular community, but it can be
one of many. For example, in the State of New York, a school board denied
enrollment to a child who lived away from her parents, with her
grandparents, in a different district.88 Her parents and grandmother signed
affidavits attesting to the grandmother’s responsibility for the child’s
“health, welfare, and education.”89 The reason given for the child’s situation
was that she was “depressed and unhappy with her current living situation
with her parents” but also that the child “want[ed] to attend school” in her
grandmother’s district.90 The court found this arrangement to be sufficient to
establish the child’s residence to attend school; “family conflict” is adequate
to confirm that the child was not a resident for the sole purpose of attending
school, even though attending school was an essential factor.
This restriction on residency for school enrollment finds constitutional
acceptance in Martinez ex rel. Morales v. Bynum.91 In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld a Texas statute regarding residence for school attendance. A
boy, young and an American citizen, mainly lived with his parents in Mexico
until he was eight years old. His parents then sent him to live with his older
sister in the United States to attend school. His sister did not want to be his
legal guardian but assumed responsibility for his schooling. The law allowed
a child living apart from a legal guardian to attend school but denied such
86

Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
88
Appeal of C.L., 40 Educ. Dep’t Rep., Decision No. 14408, 2000 WL 35921621, at *1 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t July 21, 2000).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983).
87
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enrollment if “his presence in the school district is ‘for the primary purpose
of attending the public free schools.’”92
In Martinez, the Court held in favor of the district seeking to exclude
the child, concluding that the child’s “primary purpose” of living with his
sister was to establish residence to attend school.93 There was no dispute
about him living with his sister; his sister’s home was likely his “home base”
since, as far as the case tells us, he was not going back and forth between
Mexico and the United States regularly.
The Court held that the intent prong only required a “present intention
to remain” because of the modern fact that families often move, changing
their physical location frequently.94 But if a residence were only for school,
a parent would be unable to show, in the present, that the family intended to
stay at their location beyond the time period of the child’s school attendance.
This requirement of “something more” than a parental relationship and
home-making to prove residence is special to school residency law. Again,
looking to Black’s Law Dictionary, neither residence nor domicile requires
a justification for making a child’s house into a home.95 Therefore, these laws
suggest that there is something special about schools that requires restrictions
not found in other areas of law.
Taken together, the whom, where, and why of school residency laws
show that determining a child’s residence for attending school is not as
straightforward as it appears. Next, in Parts II and III, I show that school
residency laws are not race-, class-, or gender-neutral. I do not argue that
legislatures passed the residency requirement laws with malintent or
prejudice. Instead, I show how some of the family law themes that concern
subordination are also applicable here because the residency laws rely on an
ideal-type family. The laws are themselves “family laws” because they work
to educationally subordinate certain families who do not conform to the
privileged vision of family life.
II. EDUCATION LAW’S FAMILY
The residency requirements seek answers to a specific set of questions:
Whose residence status can establish a child’s residence status? Where is a
child’s home? Why does a family choose to live where they choose to live?
These inquiries contemplate—and indeed, favor—a particular familial ideal
to grant access to school entitlements. This ideal is a family with two parents

92
93
94
95

Id. at 322–23 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(d)).
Id.
Id. at 332 n.13 (emphasis added).
Residence, supra note 44; Domicile, supra note 67.
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responsible for the child’s needs who provide for those needs in a single
residence established for purposes beyond an interest in accessing the
community’s educational resources. These ideals reflect an idealized vision
of children’s relationship with their caregivers and place. These laws
implicate the family law themes of form versus function, status versus
contract, and an analogy to the biology-plus framework for nonmarital
paternity.
A. Form v. Function
As discussed above, a child’s residence is presumed to be derivative of
their parent’s address or someone acting in loco parentis. In this regard,
residency laws echo common law coverture principles. Under coverture, a
wife ceased to have a legal identity, including residence, separate from her
husband upon marriage.96 Unlike coverture for women, which is no longer
law, this remains true for children: a child has no legal residence apart from
their parent’s residence.97 Accordingly, for a nonparent to confer the status
of educational benefits of their residency to a child, that nonparent must
function in loco parentis.98 Such an arrangement reflects a preference for an
ideal family form that ignores how many families function.
The law tasks families to conform to certain family forms and perform
a private welfare role for those in the family. Under such a framework, the
law places responsibility on family members for caring for each other’s
material needs. Clearly defined roles—“parent” and “child”— allow the state
to identify the adult obligated to protect a child’s welfare conclusively. For
example, child support laws rest on the belief that a child has a right to
financial support from both parents.99 When one parent fails in that duty,
requiring the state to fill that economic need, the law allows states to
criminalize parents who fail to perform their private welfare role.100 In this
96
JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 24 (2014) (explaining how spouses could not
sue each other in federal court because diversity of citizenship between them “was ordinarily impossible
by definition because coverture principles disabled a married woman from establishing a separate legal
residence from her husband, no matter where she actually lived”).
97
See Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Parental Rights, 71 DUKE L.J. 75, 90–96
(2021).
98
South Carolina appears to be the only state that has an option for a child to attend school according
to a residence not derivative of an adult. A child can establish residence if “[t]he child owns real estate in
the district having an assessed value of three hundred dollars or more.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-30(c).
99
Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
107, 125–28 (2008).
100
For a survey of criminal nonsupport laws, see Criminal Nonsupport Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/criminal-nonsupportand-child-support.aspx [https://perma.cc/SR2N-XN68]. Colloquially, we refer to these parents who do
not fulfill their support obligations as “deadbeats,” attaching a moral valence to the failure to pay.
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way, the “parental” form is a prerequisite to performance as a state-obligated
caretaker.
The relationship between parent and child continues to be the dominant
frame of caregiving. Family law creates an all-or-nothing situation—either
you are a parent or you are not.101 Professor Melissa Murray argues that the
law is “decidedly less comfortable recognizing nonparents when they are not
functioning as parents, but rather, with parents in providing care.”102
Many families rely on a network of adults to care for children,
disaggregating that care across multiple adults who may live in different
places.103 On average, families in the United States pay over $8,000 a year
on childcare per child so the adults can work.104 As a result, many people
may not act as parents to a child and nonetheless provide critical caregiving
that the parent alone cannot provide.105 These adults are not taking the
parent’s place in form, but are providing the crucial function of helping to
raise a child. Indeed, relatively wealthy parents may hire full-time nannies
to care for their children who may spend more time with the children than
do the parents.106
But for those without wealth and in precarious financial situations, the
family form must sometimes deviate from the archetype to fulfill the private
welfare function. The Supreme Court has recognized that non-family
members can help perform the private welfare functions we expect out of the
family. In U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, at issue were the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s eligibility rules for the Food Stamp Program.
The Food Stamp Act’s goal was “to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among
the more needy segments of our society” and was not administered to
individuals, but households.107 Initially, the Act allowed homes of “nonrelated” people to receive food stamps as long as they were “living as one
101
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 398–99 (2008).
102
Id. at 387.
103
Id.
104
Megan Leonhardt, Parents Spend an Average of $8,355 per Child to Secure Year-Round Child
Care, CNBC (May 19, 2021, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/19/what-parents-spendannually-on-child-care-costs-in-2021.html [https://perma.cc/2R8B-TKTN].
105
Murray, supra note 101, at 386.
106
Id. at 390–93 n.13.
107
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973). The Act also sought to

promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and . . . strengthen
our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To
alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will
permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels
of trade.
Id. at 433–34 (quoting the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1964)).
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economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is
customarily purchased in common.”108 An amendment removed those
families’ eligibility, making only those households of related people eligible
for receiving food stamps.109
The amendment excluded any household that included any person “who
is unrelated to any other member of the household.”110 Moreno was an
unemployed older woman who lived with a poor single mother and her three
children.111 Moreno shared living expenses with the mother, and the mother
took care of Moreno, who was in poor health.112 Both Moreno and the mother
would have been eligible to receive food stamps had they been living apart.113
But living apart, neither woman would have been able to support their other
needs, and not receiving food stamps would devastate their meager budget.
Without the food stamps, Moreno had only $10 left every month after paying
rent, transportation, and laundry.114
The law, the Court pointed out, “create[d] two classes of persons for
food stamp purposes: one class is composed of those individuals who live in
households all of whose members are related to one another, and the other
class consists of those individuals who live in households containing one or
more members who are unrelated to the rest.”115 The Court declared the
classification unconstitutional because it found that the classification was not
rationally related to any legitimate purpose; that is, it was “clearly irrelevant”
to the purpose of the Act: “[t]he relationships among persons constituting
one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with
108

Id. at 530.
Id.
110
Id. at 529.
111
Id. at 531.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 531–32. The case was a class action that included two other households that were denied
eligibility based on having unrelated persons living together:
109

Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children. Although the Hejnys are indigent, they
took a 20-year-old girl, who is unrelated to them because “we felt she had emotional problems.”
The Hejnys receive $144 worth of food stamps each month for $14. If they allow the 20-year-old
girl to continue to live with them, they will be denied food stamps . . .
Appellee Victoria Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiency. The daughter requires
special instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is located in an area in which appellee
could not ordinarily afford to live. Thus, in order to make the most of her limited resources,
appellee agreed to share an apartment near the school with a woman who, like appellee, is on
public assistance. Since appellee is not related to the woman, appellee’s food stamps have been,
and will continue to be, cut off if they continue to live together.
Id. at 532.
114
Id. at 531. The mother, after only rent expenses—the case did not discuss her transportation or
laundry costs—was left with just forty-eight dollars a month for herself and her three children. Id.
115
Id. at 529.
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their abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm
surpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements.”116 The form of the
relationship was less important than its function.117
For an example of how families in precarious situations must often
adjust the form to fulfill the function, consider multigenerational households.
According to a 2018 Pew Research Center survey, about 20% of Americans
live in multigenerational households.118 From a low of 12% in 1980, this
growth peaked in the years directly following the Great Recession,119
suggesting that when families find it hard to meet basic needs, they adapt to
living situations that deviate from the hegemonic norm. While these statistics
are about people living in the same household and fit into the existing law,
the general principle stands: nonnuclear family forms are compensatory
adaptations that fulfill the private welfare function, adaptations the law
should recognize.
Basing residence on the nuclear family form assumes only parents care
for children. These laws thus are inherently biased against children who
depend on a collective of adults to care for them to satisfy the functional,
everyday routines of caring for children. Moreover, for children who receive
care from family located in different places, their families are implicitly
illegitimate legal arrangements because they fail to conform to the archetype.
B. Status v. Contract
Being a “resident” is more than a statement about a contractual
relationship to land; for example, owning or leasing it. In other words, simply
owning or having legal possession of land does not, on its own, bestow the
status of resident. This distinction is a central theme in family law. The theme
arises most often in discussions of marriage—should we treat marriage as
the result of a bargained-for contract between autonomous individuals? Or
should marriage have some additional symbolic meaning beyond contract
principles, a symbol that justifies special treatment? The same can be said
116

Id. at 534 (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972)).
Second, it found that the real reason for the legislative amendment was a concern about “hippies,” and “a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.” Id.
117
But in other areas where family law butts up against other doctrines, the result is often different.
For example, Professor Murray points out how under many employee benefit schemes, only parents can
claim a child for health insurance even if someone else provides the bulk of childcare to the child. Murray,
supra note 101, at 407. She also points this out for the Family and Medical Leave Act. The Act
contemplates only parents as childcare givers, even if parents prefer to delegate that task to others. Id.
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D’Vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 64 Million Americans Live in Multigenerational
Households, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/arecord-64-million-americans-live-in-multigenerational-households/ [https://perma.cc/85L7-Z6UE].
119
Id.
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for residence—should we understand residence simply as the result of
contractual exchange (homeownership), or does residence have some
symbolic meaning that transcends the individual and thus entitles it to
privileges based on that relational identity?
Contract refers to “legal obligations oriented around individuals and
based in their free agreement.”120 Marriage as a contract suggests that the
“family” consists of a private agreement between autonomous individuals
making an independent choice to join in the relationship. “Status,” on the
other hand, refers to legal rules that apply to particular social arrangements,
considering marriage, for example, as a unit beyond the individual.121 Status
connotes something special about this type of relationship that should be
protected not by contract, but by state sanction and recognition.122 As a result,
in its expressive sense, the law bestows those in marriages a higher social
rank than those not married.123 Being married, then, is a status identity—an
identity that grants entitlements to certain privileges, and an identity that
allocates symbolic meanings.124
Professor Kaiponanea Matsumura provides the following as features of
“status” that help illustrate residence as connoting something more than
simply the contractual relationship inherent in ownership or possession:
First, legal rules flow from a particular identity, like paterfamilias or wife.
Second, they were bundled: one’s identity triggered various types of legal
obligations. Third, the legal rules were mandatory. Fourth, the relationships
governed by status were hierarchical: the fixed legal relationships conferred
authority to some subordinate others. And fifth, status had a clearly defined
social meaning.125

While not every feature Matsumura identifies relates to residence for
school enrollment, several do. As the residency laws illustrate, access to
schools flows from the identity of “resident.” As I have written elsewhere,
people covet the identity of “resident” because the law gives a child an
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Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Breaking Down Status, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 671, 680 (2021).
Id. at 674.
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Id. at 674–75.
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See id. at 676.
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This was a main argument for legalizing same-sex marriage. While in many states, same-sex
couples could enter contractual relationships with each other and civil unions that afforded all the benefits
of marriage, they could not enter into the status of being married. Obtaining this status was a main
objective of the same-sex marriage movement, as marriage symbolizes a formal recognition from the
state that your intimate relationship is legitimate. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669 (2015) (“[J]ust
as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic
recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”).
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Matsumura, supra note 120, at 681.
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ownership interest in the educational property based on that identity.126 Many
legal entitlements flow from residence; as discussed above, “resident”
appears in several legal definitions as a holder of rights in multiple domains.
“Residence” is hierarchical; it separates residents from nonresidents in
access to a valuable public good.
Lastly, “resident” has a social meaning that equates deservedness with
physical address, mainly within racially segregated communities with
varying quality of schools. In past work, I showed how through exclusion
across race–class-stratified jurisdictions, districts create a dynamic of
“resident v. nonresident,” with residents being middle-class White people
and community members, and nonresidents being poor Black families
without a legitimate residential claim.127 This residence–race–entitlement
connection imbues residence with stereotypes and narratives associated with
Whiteness as a favored racial identity and Blackness as a disfavored racial
identity to justify denying school entitlement. The outsiders are not just
nonresidents: they are culturally inferior to residents.
Thus, for school residency laws, the fact of a contractual relationship to
the land is not enough to convey the status of resident. That status is allimportant; without it, school districts deny many children, impoverished
children, the opportunity to benefit from well-funded and supported schools.
C. Property-Plus
As described above, school residency laws require more than physical
presence. I call this the “property-plus” principle, styled after the “biologyplus” framework for establishing paternity for biological, nonmarital fathers.
A biological father who is not married to the child’s mother can have
his constitutional rights as a parent recognized and protected only “where the
father ‘demonstrate[s] a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child.’”128
This framework illustrates a “biology-plus” conception of fatherhood, where
biology is insufficient to lay claim to parentage. Instead, the law requires
more: “performances as fathers.”129 A father must do more than have a mere
biological relationship with a child. He must act as a parent.
A biological father cannot become a legal father without evidencing
some behavior that establishes him as a parent. So too must parents who want
to lay claim to the school entitlement. School residency laws require
126

Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note 1, at 409.
See Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 575.
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Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy, 20 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L.
387, 404 (2012) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249 (1983)).
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Id.
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“property-plus” to establish bona fide residence for access to educational
property.130 It is not enough for a parent to have established a household
within a school district’s boundaries. They must do more—they must act as
a resident.
As discussed above, a district can reject a parent’s claim to residency if
that parent has not shown enough evidence of making a “home.” Whether a
parent can legitimately fulfill the role associated with being a resident—
participation in community activities, spending most of the time in one
address, enrolling children in extracurricular activities—will determine
whether a child can benefit from a district’s schools. As I have shown before,
it is this requirement that serves as an impetus for investigation: investigators
will conduct sweeps early in the morning for evidence that the child slept at
the residential address and survey the home for indications of a child living
there—food in the pantry, toys on the floors.131
But to establish a child’s residency, that “plus” requirement
incorporates aspects of the “whom” and “where” requirements. Because of
property-plus, a parent cannot send a child to live with another adult only
because that parent wants the child to get a good education. But middle-class
and affluent parents consistently rank “school quality” as a top consideration
when choosing where to live.132 Yet it is only poor and working-class families
who rely on collective childcare that need to provide some other reason in
order to establish a child’s residency.
Many families do not have such choices of where to establish a home
and why. Of course, lacking economic capital will always restrain poor and
working-class people’s choices of where to live. Financial precarity
forecloses the possibility of many parents moving to their desired residential
area. Sending a child to live with someone who cares for the child is more
affordable, and thus a smart economic choice. But the law renders these
families’ choices illegitimate and implicitly favors those who can easily
fulfill the “property-plus” requirements.
*

130

*

*

Supra notes 26–29.
Baldwin Clark, Education as Property, supra note 1, at 405 (“The Copley-Fairlawn school district
surveilled Ms. Williams-Bolar and her children, using private investigators that filmed the family.”); see
also supra note 81 and accompanying text (detailing a private investigator’s repeated trips, at the behest
of the public school, to surveil an apartment and physically follow a family to determine residence).
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ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLECLASS PARENTS ARE (STILL) GOING BROKE 8 (2003) (arguing the middle-class parents’ “most prized
possession” is a “home in a decent school district”); see Shelley McDonough Kimelberg, Middle-Class
Parents, Risk, and Urban Public Schools, in CHOOSING HOMES, CHOOSING SCHOOLS 207, 207 (Annette
Lareau & Kimberly Goyette eds., 2014).
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This Part shows how family law themes that prioritize the nuclear
family living in a singular dwelling around their personal and community
lives are pervasive in school residency laws. Children living in
nonnormative, alternative family forms are disadvantaged because their
family form deviates from the norm, even if the arrangement allows them to
benefit from the crucial private welfare role family law requires. The status
of resident transcends the contractual relationship inherent in
homeownership or legal possession by designating residents only as those
who use the address as a child’s singular “home,” around which the child’s
life outside of school must also revolve. And lastly, the laws are akin to
family law’s biology-plus framework for unmarried biological fathers,
requiring adults to perform like residents to claim residential status. In the
next Part, I argue that by disadvantaging nontraditional family forms, school
residency laws deny children education and further entrench a race–class–
gender ideal of family.
III. FAMILY LAW’S EDUCATION
To be sure, I am not arguing that school residency laws explicitly
denigrate non-White single-mother-headed households. Instead, my
argument is that these uniform rules further reify an ideal-type family that
receives privileges over many domains, including school. Nevertheless, the
laws fail to recognize legitimate family forms more prevalent in non-White
families. For example, in 2020, while only 13.4% of White children lived
with their mothers only, 46.3% of Black children and 24% of Latino children
lived with their mothers only.133
I focus on Black single-mother-headed households not because other
groups do not face these issues but because of (1) the material differences by
race discussed in the introduction and (2) the historical and contemporary
societal derision reserved for Black single-mother-headed households.
Contemporary disrespect for Black family forms, especially single
motherhood, is evident as early as the 1965 report The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action, colloquially known as the Moynihan Report after
its author Patrick Moynihan. In the report, Moynihan sought to explain Black

133
Paul Hemez & Chanell Washington, Number of Children Living Only with Their Mothers Has
Doubled in Past 50 Years: Percentage and Number of Children Living with Two Parents Has Dropped
Since 1968, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/
2021/04/number-of-children-living-only-with-their-mothers-has-doubled-in-past-50-years.html [https://
perma.cc/3URY-GZXG]. Additionally, 52% of Native American children live in single-parent homes.
Children in Single-Parent Families by Race in the United States, KIDS COUNT
DATA CTR., https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/107-children-in-single-parent-families-by-race
[https://perma.cc/QBX8-N3B2].
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economic disadvantage as caused by a “single fact of Negro American life”
that is “so little understood by whites.”134
Noting the stagnation of Black economic progress amid the Civil Rights
Movement, Moynihan argued that the “fundamental problem . . . is that of
family structure.”135 According to him, the Black family social structure
caused a “tangle of pathology” due to women-headed households:
In essence, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure
which, because it is so out of line with the rest of American society, seriously
retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on
the Negro male and, in consequences, on a great many Negro women as well. 136

Moynihan argued that this Black family is unstable and disorganized
because of the husband and wife’s role reversal.137 In addition, he noted that
employment prospects for Black men at the time of the Report were quite
dismal due to racism in education and employment.138 Even so, he argued, a
situation in which a woman is providing financially for the family may cause
a man to behave poorly, withdraw from his family, and perhaps turn to
crime.139
To his credit, Moynihan recognized that a matrilineal family was not
deficient per se. But the deviation from White middle-class family form
caused him concern:
[I]t is clearly a disadvantage for a minority group to be operating on one
principle, while the great majority of the population, and the one with the most
advantages to begin with, is operating on another. This is the present situation
of the Negro.140

Moynihan believed he was simply telling the truth to White people who
did not understand the stall of economic progress for Black people. Yet this
is no longer true: the Black family is often blamed as being behind the socalled cultural deprivations of Black communities.141
But scholars of Black family life have consistently illustrated how
Black family formations, even if different in form, are legitimately
134
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Id. at iii.
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Id. at 29.
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Id. at 30–33.
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See id. at 34 (presenting comments on this notion from White social scientists and Black civic
leaders).
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Id. at 29.
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See Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 605–18.
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functioning families. For example, in his study The Black Family in Slavery
and Freedom: 1750-1925, Professor Herbert Gutman showed that rather
than being viewed as pathology, Black family formations are evidence of
Black people’s “adaptive capacities” during and after slavery to an economic
and racial system of subordination.142 In Black families under slavery,
children often needed to be absorbed into families when their parents were
sold or died.143 To facilitate such a possible transition, nonkin were family;
enslaved children learned to refer to all Black adults as “Aunt” or “Uncle.”144
There was no bright line between parent and child that precluded other adults
from having childcare responsibilities.
In her classic study of working-class and poor Black single-motherheaded families in the 1970s, Professor Carol Stack offered a definition that
respects the family forms she noted in her work. She explained family as
“the smallest, organized, durable network of kin and non-kin who interact
daily, providing the domestic needs of children and assuring their
survival.”145 Nonkin refers to members of a family that are unrelated by blood
or marriage. The key to Stack’s definition of family is an emphasis on how
children are cared for. Under such a definition, the network consisting of not
just the parent but other kin and nonkin assumes responsibility for that child.
Rather than being unstable, poor Black familial networks in Stack’s study
were highly organized, characterized by individuals contributing and
receiving essential resources from multiple households.
Given her findings, Professor Stack argued that “arbitrary imposition of
widely accepted definitions of the family, the nuclear family, or the
matrifocal family blocks the way to understanding how [Black families]
describe and order the world in which they live.”146 Today, Black families
continue to rely on kinship networks. Kinship care involves splitting
“practical support, such as help with transportation, housework, and
childcare.”147 This networked care spreads child-caring responsibility over
several adults, an arrangement that deviates from the hegemonic White
middle-class archetype. Unfortunately, school residency laws fail to
recognize these forms as legitimate bases upon which residency can derive.
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Such a misrecognition penalizes families with culturally different, but no less
legitimate, ways of performing family.
Ms. Williams-Bolar described this dynamic in her family, in which
childcare spans both people and space. Regarding her children’s relationship
with their grandfather, the resident of the school district in which Ms.
Williams-Bolar attempted to enroll her children, she explained: “My dad
helped me raise my girls. In my culture, our grandparents are very involved
in their grandchildren’s lives. My father has helped me with my girls since
I’ve had them. That’s, you know, that’s our culture.”148 In other words, Ms.
Williams-Bolar’s father operated as a co-parent, a role that exists in many
families. Still, school residency laws do not acknowledge his formal role as
legitimate for purposes of school district residency.
Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that nonnuclear families often
provide critical care for children, and the Constitution prevents states from
such an intrusion into family life. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, an East
Cleveland zoning ordinance restricted occupancy to one “family.”149 The
ordinance defined family as
a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household . . . living
as a single housekeeping unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the
following: . . .
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household . . . provided,
however, that such unmarried children have no children residing with them. . . .
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may
include not more than one dependent . . . child of the nominal head of the
household . . . and dependent children of such dependent child.150

Inez Moore, a Black woman, lived in East Cleveland with her son Dale
Sr. and his son Dale Jr. Ms. Moore also took in her infant grandson, John Jr.,
when his mother died. However, including John Jr. in the household violated
the ordinance, for he was not a dependent child of Dale Sr. Failure to obey
the ordinance was a criminal offense.151
The city argued that the rules defining family were to “prevent
overcrowding, minimiz[e] traffic and parking congestion, and avoid[] an
undue financial burden” on the schools.152 The Supreme Court found that
while the goals were legitimate, the zoning rules served them marginally.
The ordinance was overinclusive; it forbade “an adult brother and sister to
148
149
150
151
152
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share a household, even if both faithfully use[d] public transportation.”153 It
was also underinclusive; “the ordinance permit[ted] any family consisting of
a husband, wife and unmarried children to live together, even if the family
contain[ed] a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.”154
In addition, the Court ruled that the ordinance interfered with the
“deeply rooted . . . tradition” of the family, which the Constitution protects
as a fundamental right.155 Justice Powell wrote that the nuclear family is not
the only family covered by the Constitution: “The tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents
and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.”156 Accordingly, “[w]hen a city undertakes such
intrusive regulation of the family,” judicial deference to zoning ordinances
is “inappropriate.”157 Specifically, “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland
from standardizing its children—and its adults—by forcing all to live in
narrowly defined family patterns.”158
While Moore protected families of related individuals, its premises are
relevant to the school residency laws and how they particularly disadvantage
non-White families, especially Black families. In his concurrence, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, specifically noted how the ordinance
failed to recognize how race–class–gender-subordinated communities often
had to rely on “extended family” during financially perilous times. He noted
that “[t]he ‘extended’ form is especially familiar among black families.”159
School residency laws tend to exclude race–class–gender-subordinated
families from well-resourced schools because they fail to meet the normative
standards that center family life in one place where a parent and child live
always. But “‘household’ and its group composition [is] not a meaningful
unit to isolate for analysis of family life.”160 The family is not always
confined to one place. Children often go between households. Professor
Stack explains, “A resident . . . who eats in one household may sleep in
another and contribute resources to yet another. He may consider himself a
member of all three households.”161
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But the bona fide residential laws define “home” as a singular place
where two parents provide for a child. Home need not be contextualized so
narrowly. Rather than characterizing a single structure, Professor Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse writes that
“home” is the place where there are people whose lives are
“somehow” bound up with yours, where they “have to take you in” not because
of what you can give or deserve, but because of who you “are”—your unique
place in an interlocking network of individuals, families, and communities
linked by bonds of socially constructed kinship.162

A child who is loved and toward whom adults feel obligations will find
home in more than one space, more than one location. Home is relational; a
child can find a home where there are people who care for them. These
relationships have significance across many spaces, and thus many spaces
serve the function of home. Ms. Williams-Bolar identified this phenomenon
of multiple places that her children could call home: “First of all, my dad’s
home is— that’s my family home. And my dad always told me that his home,
you know, is my home. And that’s how, you know, that’s—I’ve always, it’s
my daddy’s house. I’ve always, always been like that . . . .”163
Federal law regarding children experiencing homelessness and their
access to school is instructive to show how the school residency laws
sometimes recognize that a family’s financial circumstances require
flexibility. The McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act requires states
and districts to revise their residence requirements to ensure that children
experiencing homelessness have continuity in their educational environment
regardless of residence.164 Often such children may change where they eat
and sleep multiple times during a school year, and those changes may occur
across school-district boundary lines. Some states are also sensitive that
some children experiencing homelessness may temporarily live apart from
their parents. For example, New Hampshire requires “local school districts
to educate all homeless children who are actually living, that is, eating and
sleeping in the district, regardless of whether the student is living with his or
her parents.”165
Lastly, property-plus also imagines a specific familial relationship to
space that implicates race, class, and gender inequalities. Relatively wealthy
162
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parents can decide on schooling alone to establish residence and are more
likely to be able to prove other motives. Non-White poor parents often lack
the resources and opportunities for economic mobility. Accordingly, those
unable to access safe neighborhoods and well-resourced schools, unlike
families with resources, cannot afford to move an entire family to a soughtafter school district. Sometimes, sending one child to live with a relative parttime is the only option to ensure a child can attend a well-resourced school.
These parents must rely on adaptive family formations to get the same
outcome for their children as relatively affluent parents.
School residency laws are not the only areas in education law that
assume an ideal family with ideal resources. Federal special education law
and policy assume a parental advocate to seek appropriate accommodations
for their children.166 In the first case to interpret the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, the Supreme Court held that the procedural
requirements were sufficient to secure a child’s substantive rights under the
Act. As a result, parents with the resources to advocate for their children
within the law’s procedural confines are better able to secure resources
toward ensuring their child realizes the substantive rights to which they are
entitled.167
What then to do? To be sure, issues of stratification between school
districts are more extensive than issues of determining residence. A design
choice to fund schools based on local property taxes directly influences the
quality of education. That funding is significantly less per child in propertypoor areas than in property-rich areas.
But residency is the linchpin of these concerns, as it clearly illustrates
the problem of tying school so tightly to geography and property. The
property-tax-funding problem is directly related to residence. Those who
reside in an area are taxed to pay for schools and understandably want to
restrict that education. Concern with school financing leads many residents
to empathize with nonresidents forced into poorly funded schools.168 Still,
they maintain the belief that the fact of property-based funding justifies
exclusion.169
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167
See id. at 385 (noting that “a parent’s ability to effectively use those formal procedures”[to
achieve the substantive free appropriate public education to which the child is entitled “requires what
sociologists term cultural capital—communication patterns, knowledge, behavioral strategies, and
dispositions—to successfully navigate the cumbersome process and capture what are scarce benefits”).
168
Baldwin Clark, Stealing Education, supra note 2, at 603–04 nn.164–68.
169
Id.
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Yet systemic exclusion from well-resourced schools is inherently
subordinating, including over generations. Property-rich areas have wellfunded schools, and well-funded schools tend to provide richer educational
experiences not available to students in underfunded schools. Those
experiences allow children to amass essential economic, social, cultural, and
human capital. Given these disparities between school districts (and often
between schools within one district), parents with options will move into the
property-rich community, driving up property values. Conversely, propertypoor districts become poorer as parents leave the area or avoid the area
altogether, driving down property values. Lower property values mean fewer
dollars per child spent on the children who remain. These children will be
the most financially precarious, and may belong to families headed by single
mothers, especially non-White and Black single mothers. That precarity
forecloses access to well-resourced schools.
To be sure, school districts’ ability to plan for enrollments year to year
is undoubtedly a legitimate goal. But districts can meet these goals without
privileging some families over others, enabling children who depend on
networked childcare provided by out-of-district relatives to attend school.
Moreover, the focus on relatives recognizes that the courts are less willing
to intrude on families comprised of people related by blood, marriage, or
adoption.170
Despite the property-tax funding problem and the need for year-to-year
enrollment planning, the law and school districts must recognize three
principles when determining whether a child can attend a particular school.
First, a parent should be able to proffer evidence that their child depends on
a collective of childcaring relatives, any of which could provide the address
supporting where a child receives education. Second, the law should consider
how a child calls multiple places “home,” given those who care for them.
For example, a child’s evidence of their intimate connection to a relative’s
house should suffice to meet the home requirements. Lastly, parents should
not have to prove any reason for residency beyond attending school, because
such proof seems to be an anomaly among statutes that rely on residence as
a meaningful social category.
In addition to embracing these principles, school districts could simply
survey their communities to determine how many children the districts must
serve. Many school districts already do this for existing students, inquiring
of their families whether the child will remain in the district or go elsewhere.
170
Compare Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498–99 (1977) (striking down an
ordinance that sought to categorize the types of relatives permitted to live together), with Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 7 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that limited the number of nonrelated
individuals living in a home).
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The districts could expand that survey to the broader community, perhaps
through the mail, social media, or the like. Relatives who plan to provide
residence for a child can indicate so on the survey. The district could also
request that relatives providing residence for education enroll their children
early so that the district can plan for their enrollment.
Again, as discussed above, these are not ultimately the grand solutions
to educational subordination. Yet these suggestions both are practical and
would offer enormous opportunities to children who are otherwise
presumptively excluded because of their version of family.
CONCLUSION
Determining a child’s residence for school attendance can be highly
contested. But that decision is crucial; where a child attends school allows
them to access educational property and the benefits or disadvantages of a
particular school district. When determining a child’s residence, school
residency laws judge families against an ideal-type relationship between the
people who care for them and where that care occurs. Families that diverge
from that ideal type are distinctly disadvantaged in prevailing in a contested
residency. Residency laws especially disadvantage the children of poor, nonWhite single mothers, and especially Black single mothers. Because most
Black children are born into single-mother-headed households, residency
laws maintain race, class, and gender subordination.
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